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Abstract
We introduce the concept of a transferable utility game with uncertainty (TUU-
game). In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoﬀs of coalitions. One
out of a ﬁnite number of states of nature may materialize and conditional on the state,
the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the
case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core
as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it
is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex. We study bankruptcy games with
uncertainty and apply the Weak Sequential Core. We ﬁnd that most of the best-
known allocation rules are unstable in this setting, except for the Constrained Equal
Awards rule.
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1 Introduction
The vast majority of cooperative game theory has focused on games with deterministic
payoﬀs. Nevertheless, uncertainty plays an inevitable role in in most decision making
problems. In this paper we introduce transferable utility games with uncertainty, called
TUU-games. A TUU-game consists of two time periods, 0 and 1. In period 1 one out of a
ﬁnite number of states of nature may materialize and conditional on the state, the players
are involved in a particular transferable utility game. An allocation therefore speciﬁes a
payoﬀ to each player conditional on each possible state of nature. A utility function is then
used to assign a utility level to each proﬁle of state-contingent payoﬀs.
This new set-up provides a more general treatment of uncertainty than the approach
that has appeared in the literature so far. Granot (1977) introduced a cooperative game
where the values of the coalitions are random variables with given distribution functions,
and players are risk-neutral. This treatment is less complete since it speciﬁes only the
marginal distribution of the worths of coalitions, whereas in our approach the complete
distribution is speciﬁed, implying that for instance correlation between the worths of several
coalitions can be incorporated. Suijs and Borm (1999) and Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere,
and Tijs (1999) no longer assume risk neutrality, but keep the speciﬁcation where only
marginal distributions of worths are given. Bossert, Derks, and Peters (2005) consider a
pair of TU-games, one of which will be the true game. They do not use utility functions
but perform a worst-case analysis. Closest to our set-up is Predtetchinski (2007), where
the non-transferable utility case is studied in an inﬁnite horizon setting. His approach is
similar to ours in the sense that in both cases the game to be played is determined by the
particular realization of the state of nature.
The introduction of uncertainty into cooperative games raises many new and interest-
ing issues. When players can make state-contingent agreements before the resolution of
uncertainty, i.e. at period 0, the situation boils down to a non-transferable utility game,
and we can apply for instance the classical concept of the Core to determine allocations of
payoﬀs that are stable.
We, on the contrary, are interested in the case where no binding agreements are possible
before the state of nature is known. A typical case would be where the state of nature is not
veriﬁable by an outside court. A consequence of the absence of binding agreements is that
many ex ante desirable transfers of payoﬀs across states are not feasible. Indeed, in the
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absence of binding agreements in period 0, only allocations in the Core of the transferable
utility game that results after the state of nature is known, are enforceable.
We are interested in the appropriate deﬁnition of the Core in a TUU-game. In this
setting coalitions are allowed to form in both periods. Stability requires that a suggested
allocation cannot be blocked by any coalition at any period, i.e. both before and after
the resolution of uncertainty. We concentrate on agreements which are self-enforcing in
the sense that a coalition can only deviate from a given allocation if no sub-coalition ever
has a credible counter-deviation. Ray (1989) shows that in a static environment the set
of deviations coincides with the set of credible deviations. This is no longer true in our
setting, and leads to the solution concept of the Weak Sequential Core.
The Weak Sequential Core was introduced in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) for ﬁnite
deterministic sequences of TU-games, and it was deﬁned for two-period exchange economies
with incomplete markets in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006). In Kranich, Perea,
and Peters (2005) the Weak Sequential Core was deﬁned as the set of feasible payoﬀ
allocations for the grand coalition, from which no coalition ever has a credible deviation.
In Habis and Herings (2010) it is demonstrated that the original deﬁnition of credibility
has to be adapted in order to demonstrate that the Weak Sequential Core has a nice
characterization in terms of the cores of appropriately deﬁned subgames. In Predtetchinski,
Herings, and Perea (2006) this characterization was used as the deﬁnition of the Weak
Sequential Core in a two-period exchange economy.
We extend the notion of credible deviation of Habis and Herings (2010) to TUU-games
and show that an allocation belongs to the Weak Sequential Core only if conditional on
the state of nature it belongs to the Core of the TU-game related to that state. This
result follows from the absence of credible deviations in period 1. The absence of credible
deviations in period 0 is then used to show that an allocation belongs to Weak Sequential
Core if moreover there is no coalition in period 0 that can propose state-contingent Core
elements of the game restricted to that coalition, which gives each of its members higher
expected utility. In this way we obtain a characterization of the Weak Sequential Core.
A problem of the Weak Sequential Core concept is that the existing literature has
failed to provide a general non-emptiness result, whereas moreover both Kranich, Perea,
and Peters (2005) and Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006) give examples where the
Weak Sequential Core is empty. We provide a general result on the non-emptiness of
the Weak Sequential Core of TUU-games. We show that if the TU-game that is played
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conditional on the state of nature is convex, then the Weak Sequential Core is non-empty.
This result does not impose any assumptions on the utility functions of the players beyond
continuity and state-separability.
An important application of convex games is the bankruptcy problem. We study
bankruptcy problems with uncertainty, i.e. both the estates and the claims are allowed to
be state-dependent. Solutions to bankruptcy problems with uncertainty can be obtained by
allocating the payoﬀ in each state according to one of the rules proposed in the literature,
like the Proportional rule, the Adjusted Proportional rule, the Constrained Equal Awards
rule, the Constrained Equal Losses rule, or the Talmud rule. We refer to Thomson (2003)
for an excellent overview of the literature on the bankruptcy problem. The question we ask
is which one of these solutions belongs to the Weak Sequential Core of the game, implying
that such a solution is stable both in an ex ante and an ex post sense. We demonstrate
that the Constrained Equal Awards rule is the only one leading to allocations in the Weak
Sequential Core.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We specify the model in Section 2 and give the
formal deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core in Section 3, followed by its characterization
in Section 4. We show the non-emptiness result in Section 5. The bankruptcy problem is
analyzed in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a game with two time periods, t ∈ T = {0, 1}. In period 1 one state s out of a
ﬁnite set of states of nature {1, . . . , S} occurs. Since no confusion can arise, we also denote
this set by S. We deﬁne the state of nature for period 0 as state 0, so the set of all states is
S ′ = {0} ∪ S. In period 1 the players are involved in a cooperative game with transferable
utility, or brieﬂy TU-game, where the game itself is allowed to be state-dependent. Period 0
serves as a point in time prior to the resolution of uncertainty.
The TU-game Γs played in state s ∈ S is a pair (N, vs), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is the set of players and vs : 2
N → R is a characteristic function which assigns to each
coalition C ⊆ N its worth vs(C), with the convention that vs(∅) = 0. Player i ∈ N
evaluates his payoﬀs by a utility function ui : RS → R, which assigns to every proﬁle
of payoﬀs xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
S) ∈ RS a utility level ui(xi) and is assumed to be continuous
and state-separable, i.e. ui(xi) =
∑
s∈S u
i
s(x
i
s), where u
i
s(x
i
s) is monotonically increasing.
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are a prominent example of utility functions
satisfying these assumptions.
A TU-game with uncertainty is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A TU-game with uncertainty (TUU-game) Γ is a tuple (N,S, v, u) where
v = (v1, . . . , vS) and u = (u
1, . . . , un).
Note that there are no payoﬀs in state 0. State 0 is merely introduced as a point in time
when the players face the uncertainty in the future and may decide to cooperate. Payoﬀs
in state 0 could be incorporated into our model but our main interest is to get insight into
the eﬀect of future uncertainty on the stability of payoﬀ allocations.
Another observation is that when the cardinality of S is one, the concept of a TUU-
game collapses with the one of a TU-game. In the absence of uncertainty, all monotonic
transformations of utility functions are equivalent, and it is without loss of generality to
take ui(xi) = xi. Our interest is obviously in the cases with non-degenerate uncertainty.
The central question in a TUU-game is how the worth vs(N) of the grand coalition is
distributed among its members in every state s ∈ S. A distribution of worth, represented
by a matrix x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RS×N , is called an allocation. The state-s component
xs = (x
1
s, . . . , x
n
s ) ∈ RN of an allocation is referred to as the allocation in state s ∈ S.
The total worth obtained by coalition C in state s is xs(C) =
∑
i∈C x
i
s. An allocation for
a coalition C is a matrix xC = (xi)i∈C ∈ RS×C , with a state-s component xCs ∈ RC . The
restriction of a TUU-game Γ to coalition C is a TUU-game itself and is denoted by (Γ, C).
3 The Weak Sequential Core
We study which allocations in the game Γ are stable. In general, x¯ is stable if there is no
state s′ ∈ S ′ and no coalition C ⊆ N which has a proﬁtable deviation from x¯ at state s′.
There are various ways in which the notion of proﬁtable deviation might be formulated.
Here we concentrate on the Weak Sequential Core, introduced in Kranich, Perea, and Peters
(2005) for ﬁnite deterministic sequences of TU-games and in Predtetchinski, Herings, and
Perea (2006) for two-period exchange economies with incomplete markets. We deﬁne the
Weak Sequential Core for TUU-games.
When the classical deﬁnition of the Core (Gillies, 1959) is adapted to situations with
time and uncertainty, it is typically assumed that agents can fully commit to any state-
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contingent allocation. In this case one would deﬁne the set of utilities for a coalition C ⊂ N
as
V (C) = {(ui(xi))i∈C ∈ RC | ∃xC ∈ RS×C such that ∀s ∈ S, xCs (C) ≤ vs(C)},
thereby obtaining an NTU-game. Full commitment may be a strong and unrealistic as-
sumption in the presence of time and uncertainty. Once the state of nature is known, there
are typically players which have no incentives to stick to the previously arranged allocation
of payoﬀs. One problem with full commitment is that the state of nature may not be veriﬁ-
able by an outside court, implying that previously made arrangements cannot be enforced.
Here we analyze the case with the absence of commitments and look for agreements which
are self-enforcing.
First we deﬁne what allocations and thereby deviations are feasible for coalitions at
diﬀerent states, then we formalize the notion of credible deviations and ﬁnally we deﬁne
the Weak Sequential Core of a TUU-game. We start with feasibility at future states.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let some allocation x¯ be given. The allocation xC is feasible for a coalition
C at state s ∈ S if
xC−s = x¯
C
−s,
xs(C) ≤ vs(C).
The ﬁrst condition requires that the members of a coalition take allocations outside
state s as given. Since utility functions are assumed to be state-separable, this assumption
is harmless. According to the second condition, in state s the members of a coalition can
redistribute at most their worth.
We turn next to feasibility as state 0.
Deﬁnition 3.2. The allocation xC is feasible for a coalition C at state 0 if
x(C) ≤ v(C).
Note that feasibility at state 0 requires that the allocation must be feasible for coalition
C in every state; it requires
∑
i∈C x
i
s ≤ vs(C) to hold for all states in period 1.
We continue by deﬁning deviations as feasible allocations that improve the utility of
every coalition member.
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Deﬁnition 3.3. Let some allocation x¯ be given. A coalition C can deviate from x¯ at state
s′ ∈ S ′ if there exists a feasible allocation xC for C at s′ such that
ui(xi) > ui(x¯i), for all i ∈ C.
The allocation xC in Deﬁnition 3.3 is referred to as a deviation. Deﬁnition 3.3 can be
extended in an obvious way to deﬁne deviations from an allocation xC by a sub-coalition
D of C.
We show in the following example that deviations are not necessarily self-enforcing.
Example 3.4. Consider a TUU-game with two players and with two states in period 1
with equal probability of occurrence. The players are assumed to be strictly risk-averse ex-
pected utility maximizers. Let the state-dependent characteristic function be the following:
v1({1, 2}) = v2({1, 2}) = 1, v1({1}) = v2({2}) = 1, v1({2}) = v2({1}) = 0.
Let the allocation
x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
be given. Now consider the allocation
x = (x1, x2) =
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
,
which is feasible for the grand coalition in state 0. Since both players are risk-averse, x is
a deviation from x¯ at state 0 by coalition {1, 2}.
The allocation x is not self-enforcing though, since after the resolution of uncertainty
it will always be blocked by a singleton coalition; at state 1 player 1 can block x11 =
1
2
by
xˆ11 = v1({1}) = 1 and at state 2 player 2 can block x22 = 12 by xˆ22 = v2({2}) = 1.
Since deviations should be self-enforcing, we introduce the notion of credible deviations.
In deﬁning credibility, we follow the approach developed in Ray (1989) for the static case.
Ray (1989) shows that in a static environment the set of deviations coincides with the set
of credible deviations. This is no longer true in our setting.
Credible deviations are deﬁned recursively and by backwards induction. At any future
state, any deviation by a singleton coalition is credible. A 2-player coalition has a credible
deviation at a future state if there is no singleton sub-coalition with a credible counter-
deviation at that state. A credible deviation at a future state for an arbitrary coalition is
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then deﬁned by recursion. More formally, a recursive deﬁnition of a credible deviation at
state s ∈ S by a coalition C is as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.5. Let some allocation x¯ be given. Any deviation xC from x¯ at state s ∈ S
by a singleton coalition is credible. A deviation xC from x¯ at state s by coalition C is
credible if there is no sub-coalition D  C such that D has a credible deviation from xC
at state s.
At state 0, again, any deviation by a singleton coalition is credible. A 2-player coalition
has a credible deviation at state 0 if there is no singleton sub-coalition with a credible
counter-deviation at any state, current or future. A credible deviation at state 0 by an
arbitrary coalition is then deﬁned by recursion. More formally, we have the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.6. Let some allocation x¯ be given. Any deviation xC from x¯ at state 0 by a
singleton coalition is credible. A deviation xC from x¯ at state 0 by coalition C is credible
if there is no sub-coalition D  C and state s′ ∈ S ′ such that D has a credible deviation
from xC at s′.
Deﬁnition 3.7. The Weak Sequential Core WSC(Γ) of the game Γ is the set of feasible
allocations x¯ for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has a credible deviation.
Our deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core is diﬀerent from the one in Kranich, Perea,
and Peters (2005) and the one in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006). Kranich,
Perea, and Peters (2005) do not require the counter-deviation by a sub-coalition to be
credible, which leads to problems as demonstrated in Habis and Herings (2010). We adapt
the deﬁnition in Habis and Herings (2010) to TUU-games. The deﬁnition of the Weak
Sequential Core in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006) for an incomplete markets
exchange economy is based directly on the characterization we present in Theorem 4.4.
Example 3.4 (continued). We show that x¯ is the only allocation which belongs to the
Weak Sequential Core of the game. For an allocation x to belong to the Weak Sequential
Core, it must hold that x11 ≥ 1, since otherwise player 1 could credibly block x in state 1
by xˆ11 = v1({1}) = 1. An analogous reasoning implies that x21 ≥ 0. Similarly, x22 ≥ 1 must
hold, since otherwise player 2 could credibly block x in state 2 by xˆ22 = v2({2}) = 1, and by
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analogous reasons we have x12 ≥ 0. Now it follows from feasibility for the grand coalition
that x¯ is the only candidate element of WSC(Γ).
Clearly, singleton coalitions cannot deviate from x¯ at any state. The same is obviously
true for the grand coalition at any future state. The arguments already used to derive that
x¯ is the only candidate as a Weak Sequential Core element, imply that the grand coalition
does not have a credible deviation at state 0.
4 Characterization
In this section we provide a useful characterization for the Weak Sequential Core. Consider
a particular credible deviation at state 0 by some coalition. We show that the set consisting
of all credible deviations which improve the utility of all coalition members by the same
amount or more is a compact set.
Lemma 4.1. Let x¯ be a feasible allocation and let xˆC be a credible deviation from x¯ at
state 0 by coalition C. Let X be the set of credible deviations xC from x¯ at state 0 by
coalition C such that ui(xi) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C. Then the set X is compact.
Proof. First we show that X is closed. Consider a sequence (xCn )n∈N with x
C
n ∈ X
converging to x˜C . We need to show that x˜C ∈ X, so
(i) x˜C is a credible deviation from x¯ at state 0 by C,
(ii) ui(x˜i) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C.
The continuity of ui implies ui(x˜i) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C, thus (ii) holds.
Clearly, x˜C is a deviation from x¯ at state 0 by C, so if x˜C is not a credible deviation
then there is a credible deviation yD from x˜C at s′ ∈ S ′ by a sub-coalition D  C. Since
ui(x˜i) < ui(yi) for all i ∈ D there must be an nˆ such that if n > nˆ then for all i ∈ D,
ui(xin) < u
i(yi). This makes yD a credible deviation from xCn at state s
′ by coalition D, a
contradiction, so (i) holds. Hence, X is closed.
Now we show that X is bounded. For all xC ∈ X it holds that
xi ≥ v({i}), i ∈ C,
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since xis = vs({i}) for all s ∈ S if C = {i}, and no player in C should have a credible
deviation from xC at any s ∈ S if C is not a singleton. Therefore X is bounded from
below. Since xC(C) = v(C), it follows that X is also bounded from above.

Note that Lemma 4.1 is not true for the set of deviations rather then the set of credible
deviations, since in the case of deviations it might be possible to compensate arbitrarily
negative payoﬀs in one state by suﬃciently high positive payoﬀs in other states.
Our characterization makes use of the classical notion of the Core of a TU-game.
Deﬁnition 4.2. A coalition C can improve upon an allocation x¯ in a TU-game (N, v) if
x¯(C) < v(C).
Deﬁnition 4.3. The Core C(N, v) of a TU-game (N, v) is the collection of allocations x¯
such that x¯(N) = v(N) and there is no coalition C that can improve upon x¯.
The Weak Sequential Core can be characterized by means of the Core of suitably chosen
subgames.
Theorem 4.4. The following two statements are equivalent:
(a) x¯ ∈ WSC(Γ),
(b) x¯ is such that x¯s ∈ C(Γs) for all s ∈ S, and there is no C ⊂ N and allocation xC
such that xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C.
Proof.
(a) ⇒ (b). Consider some state s ∈ S and suppose there is a coalition C ⊂ N that can
improve upon x¯s by x
C
s . We deﬁne x
C
−s = x¯−s. Either x
C is a credible deviation from x¯
at state s by coalition C or there is a sub-coalition D  C such that D has a credible
deviation yD from xC at s. In the latter case yD is also a credible deviation from x¯ at state
s by coalition D. We have a contradiction with x¯ ∈ WSC(Γ). It follows that x¯s ∈ C(Γs).
Suppose there is C ⊂ N and xC such that xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) >
ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C. We show that if such a deviation exists then there also exists a credible
deviation, thereby contradicting (a). If xC is a credible deviation from x¯ at 0 by C, then
we are done, so suppose this is not the case. Since xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) holds for all s ∈ S, there
cannot be a credible deviation from xC at s ∈ S by some coalition D  C, so there must
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be a credible deviation yD from xC at state 0 by some coalition D  C. But then yD is
also a a credible deviation from x¯ at state 0 by D since ui(yi) > ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ D.
(b) ⇒ (a). Suppose (a) does not hold. Since x¯s ∈ C(Γs) for all s ∈ S, no coalition has a
credible deviation from x¯ at s ∈ S and so there must be a credible deviation xˆC from x¯ at
state 0 by a coalition C. We will show that then there also exists a credible deviation x˜C
from x¯ at state 0 by coalition C such that x˜Cs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, thereby violating
(b).
Let X be the set of credible deviations xC from x¯ at state 0 by C with the property
that ui(xi) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C. Let x˜C be a solution of the problem
max
xC∈X
∑
i∈C
ui(xi). (1)
Since the allocation xˆC belongs to X, X is non-empty. We know from Lemma 4.1 that X
is compact. Therefore the set of maximizers in (1) is non-empty.
We show that x˜Cs belongs to C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S. Suppose there exists a state s ∈ S
for which x˜Cs /∈ C(Γs, C). Then there is a coalition D ⊂ C that can improve upon x˜Cs by
means of yDs . Since x˜
C is a credible deviation from x¯, it is not possible that D  C, so
D = C.
We deﬁne the allocation y˜C by y˜Cs = y
C
s and y˜
C
−s = x˜
C
−s, and show that y˜
C belongs to
X. By the separability of the utility function it holds that ui(y˜i) > ui(x˜i) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all
i ∈ C.
It also holds that y˜C is a credible deviation from x¯ at state 0 by C. Suppose not. Since
ui(y˜i) > ui(x˜i) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C, for y˜C not to be a credible deviation from x¯, there
should be a sub-coalition D  C with a credible deviation zD from y˜C at s′ ∈ S ′. This leads
to a contradiction when s′ = s since yCs is credible. When s
′ = s we get a contradiction
since x˜C is credible. We have shown that y˜C ∈ X.
It follows that
∑
i∈C u
i(y˜i) >
∑
i∈C u
i(x˜i), which contradicts that x˜C is a maximizer.
We have shown that x˜Cs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S. 
For an allocation to belong to the Weak Sequential Core of the TUU-game Γ, the
allocation should belong to the Core of the TU-game Γs in every state s ∈ S. Moreover,
no coalition should be able to pick an element of the Core of the game restricted to C in
every state, and in doing so improve utility in an ex ante sense.
11
It follows immediately from Theorem 4.4 that the Weak Sequential Core of a TUU-game
with one state coincides with the Core of that game.
In a TUU-game one can distinguish ex ante and ex post eﬃciency.
Deﬁnition 4.5. An allocation x¯ is ex ante eﬃcient in the game Γ if:
(i) x¯(N) ≤ v(N).
(ii) There does not exist an allocation x with x(N) ≤ v(N) such that ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for
all i ∈ N .
Deﬁnition 4.6. An allocation x¯ is ex post eﬃcient in the game Γ if x¯(N) = v(N).
Note, that the concept of ex post eﬃciency says more than the usual feasibility con-
ditions in TU-games, since it requires
∑
i∈N x¯
i
s = vs(N) to hold at all states s ∈ S, but
contrary to ex ante eﬃciency it does not imply Pareto-eﬃciency, since it does not consider
reallocation possibilities across states.
Corollary 4.7. If x¯ ∈ WSC(Γ), then x¯ is ex post eﬃcient.
Observe that Example 3.4 demonstrates that an allocation in the Weak Sequential Core
might not be ex ante eﬃcient.
5 Non-emptiness
Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) show that the Weak Sequential Core of a ﬁnite determin-
istic sequence of TU-games is non-empty if all utility functions are linear. Predtetchinski,
Herings, and Perea (2006) give suﬃcient conditions for non-emptiness for the case of an
exchange economy with two agents. These are the only results in the literature so far re-
garding non-emptiness of the Weak Sequential Core. Both papers present examples where
the Weak Sequential Core is empty.
The Weak Sequential Core can also be empty in a TUU-game, as shown in the following
example.
Example 5.1. Consider a TUU-game Γ with three players and two future states. The
characteristic function v is presented in Table 2.
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Table 1: Characteristic function
v ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
v1 0 5 50 5 140 20 140 150
v2 0 50 5 5 140 140 20 150
Players have the utility function
ui(xi) = 1/2(1− e−0.1xi1) + 1/2(1− e−0.1xi2), i = 1, 2, 3.
By Theorem 4.4 only allocations in the Core of Γ1 and Γ2 can be stable. The Core of
each of these TU-games consists of exactly one vector:
C(Γ1) = {(10, 130, 10)},
C(Γ2) = {(130, 10, 10)}.
The resulting allocation
x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2, x¯3) =
(
10 130 10
130 10 10
)
leads to high uncertainty for players 1 and 2, which could be completely eliminated if they
cooperated. Coalition {1, 2} can credibly deviate from x¯ by perfect pooling at state 0,
using
x{1,2} = (x1, x2) =
(
70 70
70 70
)
,
and so achieving a higher utility:
u1(10, 130) = u2(130, 10) ≈ 0.8161  u1(70, 70) = u2(70, 70) ≈ 0.9991.
We have shown that WSC(Γ) = ∅.
We will show next that if Γs is convex for all s ∈ S, then the Weak Sequential Core is
non-empty.
Deﬁnition 5.2. A TU-game (N, v) is convex if for any C ⊂ N and for all S  T ⊂ N\C
it holds that v(S ∪ C)− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ C)− v(T ).
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Theorem 5.3. Let Γs be convex for all s ∈ S. Then WSC(Γ) = ∅.
Proof. Let π : N → N be a permutation, assigning rank number π(i) to any player
i ∈ N. For a player i ∈ N, we deﬁne πi = {j ∈ N | π(j) ≤ π(i)} as the set of predecessors
of player i. For every s ∈ S, the marginal vector mπ(Γs) ∈ RN is given by
mπ,i(Γs) = vs(π
i)− vs(πi\{i}), i ∈ N,
and thus assigns to player i his marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition consisting
of all his predecessors in π. We show that x¯ deﬁned by x¯s = m
π(Γs), s ∈ S, belongs to
WSC(Γ).
Since Γs is convex, it holds that x¯s ∈ C(Γs) for all s ∈ S (Shapley, 1971). Using
Theorem 4.4, it remains to be shown that there is no C ⊂ N and allocation xC such that
xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C.
Consider C ⊂ N and xC with xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S. Let i be the player in C
with the highest π(i). It holds that
xis ≤ vs(C)− vs(C \ {i}) ≤ vs(πi)− vs(πi \ {i}) = x¯is,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows since xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) and the second inequality since by the
choice of i as the highest ranked player in C according to π it holds that C \ {i} ⊂ πi \ {i}
and Γs is convex. By monotonicity of u
i we have that ui(xi) ≤ ui(x¯i), which completes the
proof. 
An interesting feature of Theorem 5.3 is that we do not need to make additional as-
sumptions on the utility functions of the players. Within the framework of expected utility,
we allow for both risk-averse and risk-loving players. Also many theories of non-expected
utility maximization are covered by our result. This is in contrast to the classical deﬁnition
of the Core, which might be empty-valued under the same assumptions. Considering the
lack of results on non-emptiness of the Weak Sequential Core in the literature so far, this
comes as a surprise.
6 Bankruptcy games
The class of convex TU-games admits a wide range of interesting applications. Examples
are airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973), bankruptcy games (Aumann and Maschler,
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1985), sequencing games (Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs, 1989) and standard tree games (Gra-
not, Maschler, Owen, and Zhu, 1996). In this section we analyze the application of the
Weak Sequential Core to bankruptcy games.
Bankruptcy games originate in a fundamental paper by O’Neill (1982). The problem
is based on a Talmudic example, where a man dies, leaving behind an estate, E, which is
worth less than the sum of his debts. The question is how the estate should be divided
among the creditors.
A bankruptcy problem is deﬁned as a pair (E, d), where d = (d1, . . . , dn) is the vector
of individual debts, and
∑
i∈N d
i ≥ E ≥ 0. Following Aumann and Maschler (1985), the
problem can be transformed into a cooperative game. The characteristic function vE,d is
deﬁned to be
vE,d(C) = max{E −
∑
i∈N\C
di, 0}, C ⊂ N (2)
so the worth of a coalition C in the game vE,d is that amount of the estate which is not
claimed by the complement of C. It has been shown by Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1987)
that vE,d is convex.
A rule is a function that associates with each (E, d) an allocation x ∈ RN such that∑
i∈N xi = E and 0 ≤ x ≤ d. A thorough inventory of the rules can be found in Thomson
(2003). The best-known rule is the Proportional rule (P) which allocates the estate propor-
tional to the claims. The Adjusted Proportional rule (AP) selects the allocation at which
each claimant i receives his minimal right max{E−∑j =i dj, 0}, then each claim is revised
down accordingly, and ﬁnally, the remainder of the estate is divided proportionally to the
revised claims. The Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is in the spirit of equality; it
assigns equal amounts to all claimants subject to no one receiving more than his claim.
More formally, we have the following.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Constrained Equal Awards rule). For each bankruptcy problem (E, d),
CEAi(E, d) = min{di, α}, i ∈ N, where α ≤ maxi∈N di is chosen so that
∑
i∈N min{di, α} =
E.
The Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL), as opposed to the CEA rule, is focusing
on losses claimants incur, and makes these losses equal, with no one receiving a negative
amount. The recommendation of the Talmud, later formalized in Aumann and Maschler
(1985) as the Talmud rule (TR) is a combination of the CEA rule and the CEL rule,
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depending on the relation of the half-claims and the value of the estate. The Piniles’ rule
(Piniles, 1861) is an application of the CEA rule to the half-claims in two diﬀerent ways,
again depending on the relation of the half-claims and the value of the estate. In our set-up
it coincides with the Talmud rule. The Constrained Egalitarian rule (Chun, Schummer,
and Thomson, 2001) also gives a central role to the half-claims, and guarantees that the
awards are ordered as the claims are. In our case it also coincides with the Talmud rule.
The Random Arrival rule (RA) takes all the possible orders of claimants arriving one at a
time, compensates them fully until money runs out, and takes the arithmetic average over
all orders of arrival.
The claims-truncated version of the rules are also considered in the literature. Trun-
cating the claims at the value of the estate does not change the result of the CEA, TR and
RA rules. The truncated-CEL and truncated-P can be blocked in the stochastic game.
Many rules are related to the solutions of bankruptcy games. The AP rule corresponds
to the τ -value (Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs, 1987), the CEA rule to the Dutta-Ray solution
(Dutta and Ray, 1989), the TR rule to the prenucleolus (Aumann and Maschler, 1985),
and the RA rule to the Shapley value (O’Neill, 1982).
Any rule belongs to the Core of the bankruptcy game. Let x¯ be the allocation that
the rule associates to the bankruptcy problem (E, d). It holds that x¯(N) = v(N) = E.
Moreover, we have
v(C) = max{0, E −
∑
i∈N\C
di} ≤ max{0, E −
∑
i∈N\C
x¯i} = max{0,
∑
i∈C
x¯i} = x¯(C),
so no coalition can improve upon x¯.
In the original estate division problem of the Talmud a man has 3 wives whose marriage
contracts specify that upon his death they should receive 100, 200 and 300 respectively.
When the man dies, his estate is found to be worth 100, 200 or 300 in three diﬀerent
scenarios.
The characteristic function of the resulting TU-games, with d =100, 200 and 300, is
shown in Table 2.
Table 3 summarizes the outcomes of a number of rules applied to the estate division
problem.
We are interested in the question to what extent the rules lead to allocations that are
self-enforcing in the presence of uncertainty regarding the value of the estate and the size
of the debts. A stochastic bankruptcy problem is deﬁned as a tuple (S,E, d, u), where S is
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Table 2: Characteristic function of estate division
vE,d ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
v100,d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
v200,d 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 200
v300,d 0 0 0 0 0 100 200 300
Table 3: Estate allocation
Player Estate TR P AP CEA CEL RA
d1 = 100
100 33 1/3 16 2/3 33 1/3 33 1/3 0 33 1/3
200 50 33 1/3 40 66 2/3 0 33 1/3
300 50 50 50 100 0 50
d2 = 200
100 33 1/3 33 1/3 33 1/3 33 1/3 0 33 1/3
200 75 66 2/3 80 66 2/3 50 83 1/3
300 100 100 100 100 100 100
d3 = 300
100 33 1/3 50 33 1/3 33 1/3 100 33 1/3
200 75 100 80 66 2/3 150 83 1/3
300 150 150 150 100 200 150
a ﬁnite set of states of nature, E = (Es)s∈S is the value of the estate in state s, d = (ds)s∈S
is the state-dependent vector of debts, and u = (ui)i∈N are the utility functions of the
claimants, where ui : RS → R. Extending the approach of Aumann and Maschler (1985)
to the stochastic case, we can transform a stochastic bankruptcy problem into a stochastic
bankruptcy game Γ = (N,S, v, u), the TUU-game where we set
vs(C) = max{Es −
∑
i∈N\C
dis, 0}, s ∈ S, C ⊂ N.
We have already argued that a rule leads to an allocation in the Core of the bankruptcy
game. This implies that for a stochastic bankruptcy game, blocking is not possible after
the resolution of uncertainty. However, it might be possible to block ex ante.
As an example, consider the estate division problem of the Talmud, where the claims
of the three wives are ﬁxed to 100, 200, and 300, respectively, but the exact value of the
estate is uncertain, and the possible values 100, 200, and 300 are equally likely. After the
uncertainty regarding the estate’s value is resolved in period 1, one of the three TU-games
is played, arising from the original three scenarios of the problem. Suppose the wives
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evaluate the payoﬀs with the utility function
ui(xi) =
∑
s∈S
1
3
(1000xis − (xis)2),
whenever 0 ≤ xis ≤ 300 for s ∈ S.1
We demonstrate that the grand coalition has a credible deviation from the allocation
speciﬁed by all the rules mentioned before at state 0, with the exception of the Constrained
Equal Awards rule. Table 4 lists the credible deviations, denoted by x, and Table 5 the
implied utilities, as well as the utilities of the allocations x¯ implied by the various rules.
Table 4: Credible deviations
Player E TR P AP CEL RA
d1 = 100
100 25 0 25 0 29
200 40 33 35 0 29
300 70 70 65 0.01 60
d2 = 200
100 25 30 25 0 34
200 75 63 80 49 83
300 110 108 110 101.13 100
d3 = 300
100 50 70 50 100 37
200 85 104 85 151 88
300 120 122 125 198.86 140
Table 5: Utilities
Player u TR P AP CEL RA
d1 = 100
u1(x¯1) 42407.41 32037.04 39374.07 0.00 37314.81
u1(x1) 42625.00 32337.00 39641.67 3.33 37572.67
d2 = 200
u2(x¯2) 63865.74 61481.48 65274.07 45833.33 66203.70
u2(x2) 63883.33 61489.00 65291.67 45833.91 66318.33
d3 = 300
u3(x¯3) 76365.74 88333.33 77774.07 125833.33 78703.70
u3(x3) 76958.33 88466.67 78216.67 125837.90 78762.33
We show next that the Constrained Equal Awards rule belongs to the Weak Sequential
Core of the stochastic bankruptcy game under rather general circumstances.
1Outside this domain the utility function can be anything, as long as it is continuous, state-separable
and monotonically increasing.
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Theorem 6.2. For i ∈ N , let the utility function be given by ui(xi) = ∑s∈S ρsw(xis),
where ρs is the objective probability of state s and w is a strictly concave function. Then
the allocation implied by the Constrained Equal Awards rule belongs to the Weak Sequential
Core of the stochastic bankruptcy game.
Proof. Let x¯ be the allocation implied by the Constrained Equal Awards rule. We
have already argued that x¯s ∈ C(Γs) holds for all s ∈ S. By Theorem 4.4 it remains to be
shown that there is no xC such that xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for
all i ∈ C
Consider a stochastic bankruptcy problem with set of players C ⊂ N , estate in state s
equal to max{Es −
∑
i∈N\C d
i
s, 0} and claims equal to dis for i ∈ C. The corresponding
stochastic bankruptcy game is denoted by (C, S, vC , (ui)i∈C). Let y¯C be the allocation
resulting from the CEA rule.
Note that for D ⊂ C, the worth of coalition D in game vCs coincides with its worth in
the original game, since
vCs (D) = max{vCs (C)−
∑
i∈C\D
dis, 0}
= max{max{Es −
∑
i∈N\C
dis, 0} −
∑
i∈C\D
dis, 0},
where either (a) Es −
∑
i∈N\C d
i
s > 0, and so v
C
s (D) = max{Es −
∑
i∈N\D d
i
s, 0} = vs(D),
or (b) Es −
∑
i∈N\C d
i
s ≤ 0, and so vCs (D) = 0 = vs(D).
We have that y¯Cs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S. We show next that y¯C maximizes the sum
of the players utilities over allocations xC with xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S.
Consider the following constrained maximization problem,
max
xC
∑
i∈C
ui(xi)
s.t.
∑
i∈C
xis = vs(C), s ∈ S, (3)
∑
i∈D
xis ≥ vs(D), s ∈ S, ∅ = D  C, (4)
where condition (3) is required for ex post eﬃciency and inequality (4) is a no-blocking
condition. A solution to the maximization problem maximizes the sum of the players’
utilities among those allocations that belong to C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S.
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We form the Lagrangian,
L(x, λ, μ) =
∑
i∈C
∑
s∈S
ρsw(x
i
s)−
∑
s∈S
μs(
∑
i∈C
xis − vs(C))−
∑
s∈S
∑
DC
λDs (
∑
i∈D
xis − vs(D)).
The ﬁrst-order conditions, which are necessary and suﬃcient for a maximum, are given by
ρsw
′(xis)− μs −
∑
DC|Di
λDs = 0, s ∈ S, i ∈ C, (5)
∑
i∈C
xis − vs(C) = 0, s ∈ S, (6)
λDs (
∑
i∈D
xis − vs(D)) = 0, s ∈ S, ∅ = D  C, (7)
∑
i∈D
xis − vs(D) ≥ 0, s ∈ S, ∅ = D  C, (8)
λDs ≤ 0, s ∈ S, ∅ = D  C. (9)
We will show that together with an appropriate choice of λ and μ, y¯C satisﬁes these ﬁrst-
order conditions. Conditions (6) and (8) hold since y¯Cs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S. To show
that the remaining conditions hold as well, we introduce two subsets of players for each
state, and distinguish two cases. For s ∈ S, let Is = {i ∈ C|y¯is = dis} be the set of those
agents whose claim is fully paid in state s.
1. Is = ∅
For all ∅ = D  C we set λDs = 0, thereby satisfying conditions (7) and (9). Since
Is = ∅, it holds for all i ∈ C that y¯is > dis. By the deﬁnition of the CEA rule, y¯is is
independent of i. It follows that ρsw
′(y¯is) is also independent of i, thus we can deﬁne
μs = ρsw
′(y¯is) for all i ∈ C to satisfy condition (5).
2. Is = ∅
Let C = {i1s, i2s, . . . , ics}, where di1s ≤ di2s ≤ . . . ≤ dics and c denotes the cardinality of
C. Then, using the deﬁnition of the CEA rule, for some k ≥ 1, Is = {i1s, . . . , iks}. For
1 < j ≤ k + 1 we deﬁne Djs = {ijs, . . . , ics}, so C \ Djs ⊂ Is and C \ Dk+1s = Is. We
deﬁne μs = ρsw
′(y¯i
1
s ), i.e. the marginal utility of the player with the lowest claim in
state s. For 1 < j ≤ k + 1 we deﬁne λDjss = ρsw′(y¯ijs )− ρsw′(y¯ij−1s ). By the deﬁnition
of the CEA rule it holds that y¯i
j
s ≥ y¯ij−1s , so λD
j
s
s ≤ 0. For other coalitions D we set
λDs = 0. It follows that condition (9) is satisﬁed. The deﬁnition of the CEA rule and
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equation (2) imply that∑
i∈Djs
y¯is = vs(C)−
∑
i∈C\Djs
y¯is = max{Es −
∑
i∈N\C
dis, 0} −
∑
i∈C\Djs
dis. (10)
Since
∑
i∈Djs y¯
i
s ≥ 0,
max{Es −
∑
i∈N\C
dis, 0} −
∑
i∈C\Djs
dis = max{Es −
∑
i∈N\Dj
dis, 0} = vs(Djs). (11)
It follows from equation (10) and (11) that
∑
i∈Djs y¯
i
s − vs(Djs) = 0, so condition (7)
is satisﬁed.
It only remains to show that condition (5) is satisﬁed as well. All coalitions D that
contain player i1 have λDs = 0, so for player i
1 this is immediate. Consider player ij
′
for 1 < j′ ≤ k. The only coalitions D such that ij′ ∈ D and λDs = 0 are of the form
{ij, . . . , ic}, for 1 < j ≤ j′. Equation (5) reduces to
ρsw
′(y¯i
j′
s )− ρsw′(y¯i
1
s )−
j′∑
j=2
(ρsw
′(y¯i
j
s )− ρsw′(y¯i
j−1
s )) = 0.
Finally, consider i ∈ C\Is. Note that all such players receive the same payoﬀ in
state s, equal to y¯i
k+1
. Since player i is part of all the coalitions Djs, we have that
equation (5) reduces to
ρsw
′(y¯i
k+1
s )− ρsw′(y¯i
1
s )−
k+1∑
j=2
(ρsw
′(y¯i
j
s )− ρsw′(y¯i
j−1
s )) = 0.
Thus y¯C satisﬁes all the ﬁrst-order conditions. It follows that there is no xC such that
xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) > ui(y¯i) for all i ∈ C.
We show next that ui(x¯i) ≥ ui(y¯i) for all i ∈ C. For all s ∈ S, it follows from the
deﬁnition of a rule that
∑
i∈C y¯
i
s = vs(C) and vs(C) ≤
∑
i∈C x¯
i
s. Using the deﬁnition of the
CEA rule it follows that for all s ∈ S and i ∈ C, y¯is ≤ x¯is. Since the utility function is
monotonically increasing, we have that ui(x¯i) ≥ ui(y¯i) for all i ∈ C. Therefore, there is
no xC such that xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C, thereby
showing part (b) of Theorem 4.4.

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The introduction of uncertainty into the bankruptcy problem leads to additional in-
sights into the nature of the division rules. While in the original static game, all the
proposed solutions are stable against deviations, it is only the Constrained Equal Awards
rule for which this crucial property carries over to the stochastic setting.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced uncertainty into transferable utility games. Since in reality
most decisions are made under uncertainty, this is a natural and important extension. It is
not straightforward though, how to deﬁne an appropriate Core concept for this stochastic
setting. In this paper we consider allocations that are stable in the absence of commitment
possibilities. These requirements lead to the notion of credibility. A credible deviation is
self-enforcing in the sense that a coalition can credibly deviate from a given allocation if
no sub-coalition ever has a credible counter-deviation. These considerations lead to the
deﬁnition of the Weak Sequential Core.
This notion of stability leads to a characterization of the Weak Sequential Core; all
allocations in the Weak Sequential Core belong to the Core of the transferable utility game
played after the resolution of uncertainty. Moreover, no coalition can block an allocation
in the Weak Sequential Core ex ante by means of an allocation that belongs to the Core
of all the ex post games reduced to the coalition. This property facilitates the application
of the concept and the proof of its non-emptiness. We show that convexity of the ex post
games is suﬃcient for the non-emptiness of the Weak Sequential Core.
A famous application which leads to convex games is the bankruptcy problem. We
introduce the stochastic bankruptcy problem and transform it into a TUU-game. We show
that most of the best-known allocation rules are unstable for stochastic bankruptcy games.
The Constrained Equal Awards rule is the only exception, and its application leads to
allocations in the Weak Sequential Core.
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